Abr. 29, 2026 6:36 am
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Colombian President Gustavo Petro reacted harshly to the recent U.S. attack on a facility in Venezuelan territory that, according to him, was linked to the National Liberation Army (ELN).

In a lengthy message posted on social media, the president once again laid out his vision of regional drug policy—a vision that blends accusations, claims lacking independent verification, and a persistent shifting of responsibility onto external actors.

Petro argued that many recent military operations have targeted the “wrong objectives” and maintained that the fight against drug trafficking must be based on “precise intelligence and effective coordination,” rather than isolated actions.

However, the president omitted a key fact: under his administration, Colombia has experienced a sustained expansion of coca cultivation and a territorial strengthening of illegal armed groups, according to reports from international organizations and Colombia’s own security agencies.

In his message, Petro stated verbatim:

“Many speedboats attacked with missiles were not carrying cocaine but cannabis. Paradox: in the United States it is legal in many places.”

With this argument, the president attempts to downplay counternarcotics operations and shift blame to what he calls the U.S. “double standard.”

Yet this framing ignores a basic reality: in Colombia, both cocaine and illegal cannabis continue to finance criminal structures responsible for homicides, forced displacement, and extortion—regardless of their legal status in other countries.

Petro went even further by blaming the Colombian Congress for the illegality of cannabis, claiming that a vote lost “by one vote” has cost the lives of “many humble boat operators,” while “not affecting a single U.S. or global consumer.”

This assertion not only lacks empirical support but also diverts attention from the fact that drug trafficking remains one of the country’s main sources of violence.

It turns out that many speedboats attacked with missiles, as is happening in the seizures we carry out in Colombia or, with our help, outside Colombia, were not carrying cocaine but cannabis. Paradoxical problem: in the US, it’s legal in many places. And the Congress of Colombia should not have allowed its illegality; it was lost by one vote—that vote has taken the lives of many humble boatmen, and not a single American or global consumer. Trump is completely wrong. Cocaine to Europe is going by submarine and container. Cannabis is the one being illegally targeted. The ELN in Catatumbo, and Front 33, must decide whether to compete for cocaine or for Peace. It’s barely 5% of the cocaine produced in Colombia that goes there. We know that Trump bombed a factory in Maracaibo; we fear they mix coca paste there to make it cocaine and take advantage of Maracaibo’s location by the sea. It’s simply the ELN. The ELN is allowing, with its trafficking and its mental dogma, the invasion of Venezuela. The Colombian army must now take «Filo Gringo» in Catatumbo and substitute crops. Today, with the expansion of coca leaf cultivation in Latin America, facing a demand that only grows too much in Europe, the price of cocaine has plummeted. There are huge warehouses in Africa storing tens of tons of cocaine, and the price of coca leaf in Colombia has plummeted; now cannabis and illicit gold are more profitable than cocaine. It’s time for substitution; the state must seize the opportunity. Trump has been made to believe that I’m a front man for Maduro, and that’s where his latest references to me come from; I thought American intelligence was more professional, or that, being so, the President of the US doesn’t listen to it and surrounds himself with greedy far-right folks who don’t seek the truth. A few days beyond the new year, I’ll recount the particularities of my relationship with Chávez’s progressive movement and my frustrations about what was left of his government after he died. I don’t know if Maduro has illegally extracted riches from Venezuela; in our country, there’s no proof of drug trafficking on his part. The generals we confirmed were negotiating cocaine were in the sedition with support from the Colombian government, seeking a coup in Caracas. But by now, the professional investigators in the US should have confirmed that neither I nor my close family members have assets outside the country or in Colombia, other than my house, which I’m still in debt on. Even the New York Times has already published an article saying they haven’t found any proof against me to keep me on the OFAC list. What a blunder by the US government. My last phone conversation with Maduro was about how to jointly strike the ELN on the border. I am a free man and always will be, and I don’t care about the greed.

Regarding drug trafficking routes, the president was categorical:

“Cocaine to Europe goes by submarines and containers. Cannabis is what is being illegally attacked.”

While it is true that organized crime has increasingly sophisticated its methods—a fact acknowledged by international law enforcement agencies—this does not absolve the Colombian state of responsibility. On the contrary, it underscores how current policies have failed to curb the illicit trade.

On the ELN, Petro once again adopted a contradictory narrative. He stated:

“The ELN in Catatumbo, and the 33rd Front, must decide whether they compete for cocaine or for peace.”

At the same time, he acknowledged their territorial control and central role in cross-border drug trafficking. In practice, negotiations without concrete results and poorly designed ceasefires have allowed the ELN to consolidate itself as a transnational actor, even operating from Venezuelan soil.

The president also claimed:

“We know that Trump bombed a factory in Maracaibo; we believe they mix coca paste there to make cocaine. It is simply the ELN.”

Even so, Petro insisted on absolving Nicolás Maduro’s regime of any direct responsibility, stating that “in Colombia there is no evidence that Maduro is involved in drug trafficking.” This position contrasts sharply with multiple investigations and international sanctions that have documented the Venezuelan regime’s tolerance—if not outright collaboration—with criminal networks and armed groups.

In a clearly defensive tone, Petro further asserted:

“Trump has been made to believe that I am a front man for Maduro… What a mistake by the U.S. government.”

He added that neither he nor his family own assets abroad, even citing The New York Times to claim there is no evidence against him. This personal emphasis reinforces the perception that the president prefers to portray himself as a victim of international conspiracies rather than account for the results of his domestic governance.

Petro concluded by reiterating his commitment to crop substitution, stating that “today cannabis and illegal gold are more profitable than cocaine” and that the state must “seize the opportunity.”

However, substitution policies without effective territorial control or real state authority have repeatedly failed in Colombia, leaving entire communities at the mercy of armed groups.

The debate reopened by these statements is legitimate and transcends borders. But while the president continues to blame the United States, Europe, Congress, foreign intelligence services, and previous governments, the facts are stark: Colombia is less secure today, drug trafficking has diversified, and illegal groups have greater operational capacity than at the start of his term.

More than lengthy speeches and external accusations, the country needs results. And so far, Gustavo Petro’s security policy has produced exactly the opposite of what it promised.

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